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Legitimacy, Local Participation, and Compliance in the Galapagos Marine Reserve  
 
1. Introduction  
The objective of this paper is to develop an empirical study of the behavior of the 
boat-owners of the small scale fishery fleet of Galapagos (SSFFG) in relation to their 
decision to transgress the regulations.
1   The analysis is devoted to identify the decisive 
factors that motivate the decision to infringe the current regulations, and to estimate the 
effect of these factors on this decision. Concerning the decision to transgress the 
regulations, the study puts special emphasis on estimating the impact of the following: the 
participation of boat-owners in the institutions that comprise the participatory management 
system of the Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR), the perception of boat-owners regarding 
the legitimacy of regulations, and the traditional enforcement instruments available for the 
authority (surveillance and fines). The empirical analysis is based on the theoretical 
contribution regarding the behavior of an individual fisherman proposed by Sutinen and 
Kuperan (1999).  
The paper is organized in five sections. In section 2 we briefly describe the 
regulatory system currently used in the GMR.  Section 3 contains a description of the 
theoretical model on which the empirical analysis regarding the decision of infringing the 
regulations is based. The theoretical specification is used to perform an empirical analysis 
of the effect of the independent variables on the decision to transgress the agreed 
regulations. This section concludes with an econometric specification used in the empirical 
analysis.  
                                                 
1 In this document, the term “boat-owner” refers to a small-scale fishery boat-owner from 
Galapagos. 
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Section 4 addresses the empirical verification of the model.  In this section we 
present the results of the econometric estimations of the boat-owners’ decision model. The 
results allow us to evaluate the relevance of the different variables included in the model, 
with a particular emphasis on those related to traditional enforcement activities and to the 
participatory management system of the GMR. As a result, aspects such as surveillance, the 
application of fines, the legitimacy of the norms, the sense of ownership to the community 
and participation in the local organizations that comprise the system, are evaluated on their 
contribution to reduce the transgressions of the regulations.  
  Finally, in section 5 we discuss conclusions that arise from this analysis.  In 
addition, we present some insights on policy options to improve the compliance of the 
fishery regulations in the GMR.  
 
2. Management System in the Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR). 
The management system in Galapagos is an innovative experience  in the 
management of natural resources and one of the few examples in Ecuador and in the world 
in which the management scheme incorporates the rights and responsibilities of local users 
in the decision-making process of the administration of a protected area (Heylings and 
Bravo, 2002).  The management system was established as part of the Law of the Special 
Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Province of Galapagos 
(LSRCG) in 1998, to face the existing conflicts of the use of natural resources among 
antagonistic groups of the marine reserve and, as a strategy, to obtain local users’ 
commitment towards the decisions and regulations devoted to improve the management 
and conservation of natural resources, as well as to promote compliance of these 
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regulations
2.  The LSRCG contains a series of instructions that seek to delegate decision-
making of natural-resource management, especially fishery resources, to a local 
coordination body constituted by representatives of the tourism sector, the small-scale 
fishery sector and the conservation sector.  In addition, the Law grants to the Galapagos 
National Park (GNP) the authority and the instruments required to promote the 
implementation of regulations and decisions agreed to by the mentioned sectors.  
In regard to small-scale fishery, the LSRCG establishes two main aspects with the 
aim to regulate the use of fishery resources in the marine reserve.  First, the Law considers 
the establishment of a local management regime of a common property resources with an 
identified and limited group of users.  In this sense, the LSRCG restricts fishery activities in 
the area of the GMR to small-scale fishery, as it is defined in the Management Plan (Article 
42, LSRCG) and applies entrance barriers to small-scale fishery through the imposition of a 
series of requirements that affect both fishermen and boats.  
Second, the Law establishes a scheme of decision-making for the control of small-
scale fishery activities
3.  This consists of the involvement of local fishermen in the 
                                                 
2 These aims are reflected in the vision of the new management regime elaborated by the 
Grupo Núcleo (group made up of representatives of the fishery and tourism sectors in the 
Galapagos, the Charles Darwin Foundation, the GNP and the Fisheries Bureau) in June 
1997.  The vision highlights the effective participation of local sectors in decision-making 
as a key element to promote local commitment towards the compliance of the regulations  
(Heylings, et al. 1998). 
3 The decisions agreed upon to regulate small-scale fishery have their origin in the 
participatory management system established by the LSRCG, which works through three 
levels: 1) the GNP, who is responsible for the administration of the area and the control of 
natural-resource management; 2) the Inter-Institutional Management authority (IMA), 
which is comprised of institutions which have competence and control over the area; it is 
also the top level agency for policy making in regard the management of the GMR; and 3) 
the Participatory Management Board (PMB), the body that channels the responsible 
participation of local users of the reserve, including small-scale fishermen.  Decision-
making begins with a participatory process in which local users of the reserve submit their 
proposals to the PMB to be discussed.  The decisions agreed upon by consensus in the 
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decision-making  process through the Participatory Management Board where several 
aspects related to the development of fishery activity are analyzed in this body and 
subsequently proposed to the Inter-institutional Management Authority (IMA). The 
decisions taken in this regard are summarized in the fishery calendar, which is the 
instrument that contains information about which kind of species to catch, their quotas and 
seasons.  Once approved by the AIM, the fishery calendar becomes the “rules of the game” 
which the small-scale fishermen must obey.  
Furthermore, the LSRCG designates the Galapagos National Park Direction (GNPD) as 
the organism in charge of the administration and control of the GMR.  With these aims, the 
GNPD should keep records of and regulate the number of individuals involved in small-
scale fishery; control the activities that are carried out in the reserve through a surveillance 
and patrol program; and in the case that an infraction be detected, establish administrative 
procedures against the offenders and apply the sanctions described in the LSRCG.  
In an peer review of the strategies and activities performed by the management 
authority to promote compliance of regulations among the boat-owners of the SSFFG, 
Viteri and Chávez (2002) analyze the results of such activities and identify, in a preliminary 
way, factors that impact the decision to comply with the regulations.  This study, of 
descriptive nature, concludes that while the activities of surveillance and patrolling achieve 
a detection level of 6% of the fleet concerning transgressions of fishery regulations, the 
occurrence of transgressions could be larger.  In addition, according to responses obtained 
from a field survey directed to the boat-owners of the SSFFG (see section 3.3) the self-
                                                                                                                                                     
PMB pass to the IMA for their approval by voting.  Inside, the PMB the GNP behaves as 
any other stakeholder seeking a consensus; in the IMA, the GNP serves as Technical 
Secretariat.  Then, the GNP is responsible for implementing the decision made, with the 
support of the co-responsible stakeholders in the system. (Heylings and Bravo, 2002). 
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declared rate of regulation transgressions is close to 30% of the total boat-owners, 
suggesting that the objective to reduce the occurrence of transgressions to the agreed 
fishery regulations is not bounded just to improve  logistical or technical aspects to increase 
the surveillance capacity of the authority, but also to address social and economics aspects.  
The preliminary evidence on the observed infraction levels to the fishing norms in the 
GMR, encourage us to analyze with more detail the determinant factors that motivate the 
boat-owner to transgress the agreed norms.  
 
3.  Behavior of the Fishery Boat-Owner  
In this section, we describe the theoretical model regarding the decision of the 
individual to infringe the regulations, in which our empirical analysis is based.  We briefly 
disccuss a deterrence model, where the infraction decision is motivated by purely economic 
variables (expected costs and benefits of transgressing the regulations) as well as social 
variables, which we consider to be decisive for the transgression decision
4.  Then, we 
specify  an econometric model to carry out the empirical verification.  
 
3.1 Individual decision to transgress the regulations.  
The literature on common-property resources that analyze the performance of 
governing systems, suggests that compliance of regulations does not depend only on 
economic variables, such as the expected earnings of illegal activity or fines faced by the 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
4 The literature of common-property resources that analyze the performance of governing 
systems suggests that compliance of regulations does not depend only on economic 
variables, such as the expected earnings of illegal activity or fines faced by the offender, 
but also on social variables such as legitimacy of the regulations, local control, membership 
of a community, participation levels, degree of the individual's moral development and 
social pressure. [See: Bardhan (1993), Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), Beckenkamp and 
Gümbel (2000), Cardenas et.al. (2000), Hatcher et. al (2000)]. 
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offender, but also on social variables such as legitimacy of the regulations, local control, 
membership of a community, participation levels, degree of the individual's moral 
development and social pressure. [See: Bardhan (1993), Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), 
Beckenkamp and Gümbel (2000), Cardenas et.al. (2000), Hatcher et. al (2000)]. 
Our conceptual understanding of the individual decision to transgress the regulations is 
primarily based the contribution of Sutinen and Kuperan (1999). The model explains the 
fisherman's behavior facing the decision of infringing the norms; it merges the basic 
deterrence model with intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that influence the individual's 
decision of whether to obey the law.   
Specifically, to evaluate the influence of social factors in the decision to comply with 
norms, Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) extend the clasical deterrence model of Becker (1968) 
by explicitly considering two additional factors: the moral and social reputation of the 
individual.  The first factor describes how the compliance decision is influenced by 
individual’s moral development, personal values and perception of the legitimacy of the 
norm. The second factor attempts to reflect how social pressures inside the community 
affect to the individual’s decision 
5.   
 
Likewise, Bardhan (1993) suggests that the compliance of social norms will depend on, 
among other aspects, the level of legitimacy of the norm, the institutions which promote 
that norm and the level of ownership of the individual to the community.  Hatcher et. al. 
(2000) underlines that it is frequently suggested in the current literature of fishery 
                                                 
5 In the same line, Hatcher et. al  (2000) analyze the non-monetary factors that affect the 
compliance  of a catch quota among fishermen of the United Kingdom.  Their model, as in 
the model of Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), is an extension of the basic deterrence model to 
evaluate the influence to compliance of moral obligation, peer attitudes and perceived 
legitimacy of the norm.  In this case, the authors show that a better level of involvement of 
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management with local focus on  “co-management” that broader participation of fishermen 
in the management process results in an increment of compliance levels due to the 
regulations being agreed upon with more legitimacy. This fact can be understood as the 
individual feeling a moral commitment towards the compliance and success of the 
regulations, under the premise that when an individual identifies with a regulation and he 
does not feel it to be an obstacle to his freedoms imposed by some external body; this 
regulation is more likely to be successful
6.  
According to Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), the inclusion of the individual's social 
reputation and their commitment to the institutional framework results in two effects.  First, 
the number of offenders decreases because the condition for the decision about infringing 
the norms is stricter than in the simple case of the classic model of deterrence.  Second, 
since in the extended model the marginal costs of infringing are larger than the marginal 
costs of infringing in the context of the classic model of deterrence, the magnitude of the 
infraction decreases because fishermen allocate less effort to illegal activities.  
Thus, following the analysis of the fisherman's compliance decision carried out by 
Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) and Hatcher et. al. (2000), and from considering the 
participatory management system of the GMR and its potential effects over the compliance 
decision, we consider a set of social factors that we presume influence the individual's 
behavior: legitimacy of regulations and institutions related to fishery management; the 
                                                                                                                                                     
individuals in the management process  leads to better compliance levels since the 
regulations will be accepted with more legitimacy. 
6 Cárdenas, Stranlund and Willis (2000) introduce a similar proposition in their 
conclusions.  In addition, it is worth reviewing Martin Beckenkamp y Wiebke Gümbel 
(2000) who  addressed the issue of freedom losses due to external regulations and their 
effect on an individual’s behavior in the framework of common property resources. 
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boat-owner’s sense of belonging to the community; and the boat-owner’s participation in 
local organizations.  
3.2 Hypothesis   
            The empirical analysis is guided by the theoretical response observed in 
boat-owner compliance behavior when changes are perceived in independent variables.  As 
in Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), we denote Y* as the difference between the maximum 
expected utility transgressing the regulations and the maximum utility the individual gains 
by obeying the regulations; that difference is likely to depend on variables such as the price 
of landings (p), the surveillance effort from regulatory authority (probability of detection 
and conviction) (v), the magnitude of fine ( f ), the cost structure linked with the 
characteristics of the vessel (size, power, employees, storage capacity, etc) (k ), the 
legitimacy of the current regulations (l), the sense of belonging of the individual in the 
community (s), the participation level that the individual has in the institutions involved in 
the creation of the norm (u), and a set of characteristic of each individual (a ),  that is:  
 
) , , , , , , , (
* a u s l k f v p Y   [1] 
 
We interpret Y* as the magnitude of the incentive that individuals have to not 
respect the rules and to allocate effort to illegal fishing activity; it means that if the 
difference is positive then there are incentives to make infractions (If  , individuals 
infringe the regulation).  It can be shown that the magnitude of the incentive to infringe 
diminishes as result of increases in the surveillnce effort from the regulatory authority 
(detection and conviction probability), as well as for positive changes in the magnitude of 
the fine.  The same effect is observed when we consider social variables, thus  the incentive 
to infringe responds negatively to variations on  the legitimacy of norms, the sense of  
0 *≥ Y
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belonging of individual,  and the individual’s participation levels on the institutions that 
generate the norms.
7   
3.3 Econometric model specification and data description  
In this section, we are interested in evaluating the probability of violating an agreed 
regulation by a boat-owner of the small scale fishery fleet of Galapagos. The equation we 
use to evaluate the decision to transgress a regulation is
8:  
 
INFRACTIONi= INFRACTION [ZONE, MOTORHP, AGE, PROB1, PROB2, PROB3, 
PUNISH, FINE, STORAGE, DAYCOST, CAPITAL, INDEBT, PRICEIND, MARRIED, 
FAMILIA, EDUCACI, ISLAND1, REGGRL, REG_SH, REG_SE, REG_SC, OTROS, 
JMPAIM, LEAD_REP, NATIVO, MOVECONT, YRSMIG, FISHEXC, YRSEXP, 
COOPDIR, ATTEND].   
[2] 
 
Where, INFRACTION is equal to one if the fisherman violates the regulations, otherwise 
the variable takes a value of zero. Assuming a normal distribution of errors, the probability 
of observing INFRACTIONi = 1 is given by the value of the normal distribution function 
evaluated with the estimated parameters coming out from the equation [2].  
The data used in the estimates are from the field survey directed to the boat-owners 
of the SSFFG done in September 2002.  The survey was carried out thanks to the 
collaboration of the Galapagos Small-Scale Fishermen Cooperatives: COPESPROMAR 
(acronym in Spanish), Cooperative of Fishery Production “San Cristóbal”(COPESAN, 
acronym in Spanish), Cooperative of Fishery Production Horizons of Isabela, and 
Cooperative of Galapagos Small-Scale Fishery Production (COPROPAG, acronym in 
Spanish); and the Participatory Management Board.  The survey was confidential; as a 
result, no data that could reveal the identity of the boat-owner was requested.  In addition, 
  9
                                                 
7 Comparative static results were obtained by Sutinen and Kuperan (1999).   
8 The meaning of each variable can be observed in Table 1(a).  
the survey design allowed the boat-owner to fill out the survey on his own
9.  We got, 155 
observations of a population of 426 small-scale boat-owners registered by the Unit of 
Marine Resources of the GNP.
10  
The survey included several sections that address different topics. In the first 
section, the survey requested information about the characteristics of the boat-owners and 
their families.  The second section asked data about technical characteristics of the boat and 
details of the fishery activity. The third section inquired about the boat-owners’ perception 
of the surveillance activities performed by the authority.  The fourth section interrogated 
the boat-owners about their behavior in regard to the compliance of regulations; the last 
section asked boat-owners about their perception regarding the fishery regulations, the 
management authorities, the fishermen cooperative and their participation in these 
organizations.  
In the section about compliance, the survey asked boat-owners to choose a sentence 
that best described their fishery activity in the last season (2001); it also asked them directly 
if in the last season the boat-owner committed some of the most frequent infractions 
according to the records of the GNP’s patrolling reports.  Thus, with the information 
collected, we proceeded to classify the boat-owner as offender or non-offender. We define 
an offender to be any individual who stated that, in the last season, their fishery activities 
“rarely fulfill the regulations, because there are too many stipulations”, or who stated 
directly that they have carried out some activity judged as an infraction.  
                                                 
9 To maintain confidentiality, the results of this paper do not refer to any specific town. 
10 In the sampling, we employed stratified sampling technique (Scheaffer, 1986).  The 
sample was divided into three strata according to boat type (boat, fibra and panga); to make 
this division we used the detection variances observed in each boat type group of boat-
owners. Additionally, the selected strata were distributed proportionally among the three 
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In Tables 1(a) and 1(b), we present a description of the variables used in the 
econometric estimations with their possible values and a description of basic statistical 
information (average and standard deviation).  Table 1(a) is divided in two sections. The 
first section shows the dependent variable (INFRACTION) that represents the decision to 
infract a regulation. The second section shows, contained in blocks, the explanatory 
variables used for the estimate. Each block represents an element of the vector of 
independent variables specified in the theoretical model:  u s l a p k f v , , , , , , , .  
Thus, block I “Probability of Detection and Punishment (v)” contains the variables 
ZONE, MOTORHP, AGE, PROB1, PROB2, PROB3, and PUNISH; and attempts to  
represent the perception of each boat-owner regarding the probability that an offender is 
detected and punished. Block II “Magnitude of the fine  ( f) ”  contains the variable FINE, 
and represents the size of the fine perceived by the boat-owners. Block III “Structure of 
Costs (k )” includes STORAGE, DAYCOST, CAPITAL, INDEBT; and indicate the cost 
structure faced by the boat-owners. The block IV “Structure of Prices (p)” has the variable 
PRICEIND ; which is an indicator of market prices that the boat-owner observe of the 
caught species. Block V “Individual Characteristics (a )” contains MARRIED, FAMILIA, 
EDUCACI, ISLAND1; these describe the personal features, family characteristics and 
place of residence of each boat-owner. Block VI “Legitimacy of the Regulations and 
Authorities that promote them (l)” includes: REGGRL, REG_SH, REG_SE, REG_SC, 
OTROS, JMPAIM, LEAD_REP; which represents the degree of legitimacy that regulations 
and authorities that promote them have among the boat-owners. Block VII “Sense of 
Ownership to the community (s)” contains the variables: NATIVO, MOVECONT, 
                                                                                                                                                     
towns.  The sample size resulted in 148 observations of a population of 426 boat-owners, 
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YRSMIG, FISHEXC, YRSEXP; and represents the level of ownership of the boat-owner 
towards his town and union.  Finally, block VII “Participation (u)”, includes: COOPDIR, 
ATTEND, attempts  to indicate the degree of involvement of the boat-owner in the local 
organizations (cooperatives).  Additionally, Table 2(b) exhibits the expected signs of the 
parameters resulting from the econometric regressions.   
Insert Table 1(a) 
Insert Table 1(b) 
 
 4. Econometric Results 
This section first presents the econometric results obtained from the estimation of 
the decision model of the  infringement of fishery regulations by the SSFFG.   Secondly, 
based on the previous estimations, the impact of the independent variables on the decision 
to violate is quantified. 
4.1 Estimation results of the decision model of the infringement of fishery regulations 
Due to the dichotic nature of the dependent variable, a PROBIT model was 
employed to carry out the estimations.  Table 2 shows the results corresponding to two 
models.  The first, Model 1, is estimated according to the original specification of equation 
[2].  Model 2 incorporates the elimination of certain variables based upon the results of the 
first model: variables that were determined to be non statistically significant, highly 
correlated variables and the variable PUNISH that obtained a sign that was contrary to what 
was expected
11.  This way, a simpler specification of the model was obtained
12.  
                                                                                                                                                     
with a theoretical error of 3% and a confidence level of 95%. 
11 This variable does not adequately represent the factor that we wish to represent: the 
existence of previous experience with authorities increases the certainty of being punished, 
which would thus have an effect on the probability of being detected and punished for 
committing an infraction. This is probably due to a spurious relation between CSTIGANT 
and the dependent variable. 
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Insert Table 2 
To evaluate the relevance of the econometric specification of the model, it is useful 
to focus on two elements of Table 2.  First, the maximum-likelihood statistic whose   
value is presented   to  test the global significance of the model through the evaluation of 
the following null hypothesis:  , where k = number of parameters in the 
model.  Due to the fact that the in the two cases, the statistic is higher than the critical 
value, the null hypothesis is rejected and thus we can affirm that the parameters estimated 
together are statistically different to zero and therefore both models are relevant when 
explaining the decision to infringe by the small-scale boat-owners.. 
2 χ
0 .... : 2 1 = = = = k o H β β β
The second relevant indicator that suggests to us the appropriateness of the model is 
the percentage of correctly predicted  observations:  85.5% for the first model and 80.5% 
for the second.   This tells us that both models, based on the information of the independent 
variables, can correctly forecast the individual’s compliance decision in more than 80% of 
the observations. 
It is interesting to highlight that the majority of the individual estimated parameters 
turned out to be statistically significant and to have the expected signs according to the 
                                                                                                                                                     
0 : = i o H β 0 : 1 ≠ i H β
) ln .(ln 2 NR R L L MV − − =
2 χ
2
) 20 ( χ
12 The variables with high correlation were: ANIOSMGR with  NATIVO; and ANIOENPE 
with EDAD. Highly correlated variables were considered to be those variables with 
correlation coefficients higher than 0.5. Furthermore, in order to avoid the omitted variable 
problem, a omitted variable test was carried out before the elimination of each variable.  
Here, the evaluated null hypothesis  , against the alternative hypothesis  . For 
this, we use the maximum-likelihood  , which has a   distribution; its 
critical value with 1 degree of freedom is 3.84 (at 5% level of significance). As a result, Ho 
was not rejected. Furthermore, the Wald-statistic was calculated to evaluate the null 
hypothesis that the parameters of the 20 variables eliminated as one group are all equal to 
zero.  The value obtained was 22.44 for which the null hypothesis is not rejected [ critical 
value at the 5% significance level is   = 31.41], that is to say, the 20 parameters of 
the variables equal to zero as a group.  
  13 
related literature.  If we consider the parameters that turned out to be relevant taking into 
account the blocks in which the independent variables were, it can be noted that all blocks 
had at least one relevant variable except for Block IV “Structure of prices”, which is to say 
that the factors considered in the theoretical model are relevant to the individual’s decision 
to infringe.  In Block I “Probability of Detection and Punishment”, the variable PROB1 
was relevant and had the expected sign. For Block II “ Magnitude of the fine ( f) ” , FINE 
was relevant and had the expected sign.  In the case of Block  III“ Structure of Costs  (k )”, 
only the variable STORAGE was relevant with the expected sign; this can be easily 
explained by the correlation that may exist between the variables of this block, since, for 
example, a large storage capacity may be related to high costs and a higher capital 
investment.  Block IV which contains the INDPREC obtained an expected sign, however it 
was not statistically relevant; probably due to its elaboration this variable does not 
adequately reflect the economic incentives for the boat-owner to transgress the 
regulations
13.  
The results obtained in these first four blocks confirms the relevance of the 
probability of detection, the amount of the fine, and economic considerations as 
determinant in the decision to infringe.  
The variables ISLAND1 and EDUCACI from Block V “Individual Characteristics 
(a )”, were registered as statistically relevant with positive signs. This is to say that 
                                                 
13 It should be remembered that the variable INDPREC (price index) is constructed based 
on market prices of the species that the boat-owners are dedicated to catch and weighted by 
the percentage that each species represents in the total capture.  Other authors who analyze 
the price effect on compliance levels of boat-owners concentrate one or two types of 
infraction and try to reflect the economic incentive for the boat-owner to infringe by 
identifying any difference that may exist between mean productivity of legal and illegal 
activities.  
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individuals that reside on that specific island or those with a higher level of education are 
more likely to infringe than the rest of the boat-owners who do not display these 
characteristics.  For Block VI, “Legitimacy of the Regulations and Authorities that promote 
them”, the following variables were observed to be relevant with the expected sign: 
REGGRL, REG_SC, OTROS y LEAD_REP. Block VII, “Sense of Membership of the 
community(s)”, as contains various relevant parameters (YRSMIG and YRSEXP),and have 
the expected sign.  For the last block “Participation  (u)” the variable ATTEND turn out to 
be relevant with the expected sign. As in the case of the previous blocks, the results 
obtained from blocks VI–VIII  of special importance because they corroborate the results 
obtained in different studies of the management of local common resources which highlight 
the importance of social factors such as legitimacy, membership and participation, on the 
decision of the compliance of norms.  
 
4.2 Effect  of the independent  variables on the decision to infringe. 
Considering the results of estimation of the decision model for the small boat-
owners of the LSRCG, we proceeded to calculate the marginal effects of the relevant 
variables on the infringement decision.  The importance of evaluating these marginal 
effects lies in desire to appreciate the isolated effect of one independent variable over the 
dependent variable.  Table 3 shows the results of the  marginal effects obtained for each 
variable – we can see that there is no great difference between the results obtained for 
model 1 and model 2 in respect to the relevant variables.  Therefore, only comments 
regarding the results of model 2 will be presented. 
In Block I “Probability of  Detection and Punishment (v)”, the variable PROB1  has 
a marginal effect over the probability of infringement of –0.14. This is to say that boat-
  15 
owners who affirm that they have seen with some frequency the surveillance of the GNP 
and the National Navy have 0.14 less probability of committing a transgresion.  For Block 
II “ Magnitude of the fine  ( f) ”  the variable FINE has a marginal effect of –0.25 , while in 
Block III “Structure of Costs (k )”,  the proxy STORAGE reaches a marginal effect of 
0.04.  This is to say that those individuals that consider the GNP fines to be high have a 
0.25 lower probability of transgression.  Furthermore, when considering storage space, we 
observe that the probability of infringement increases by 0.04 for each metric-ton 
increment.    
In the following group of variables from Block V “Individual Characteristics (a )”, 
the variables  EDUCACI  and ISLAND1 obtained  marginal effects of 0.04 and 0.30, 
respectively. This indicates that for each additional year of education, the probability of 
infringement rises by 0.04
14.  Also, if the boat-owner resides on Island 1, the probability of 
infringement increases by 0.30.  Block VI “ Legitimacy of the Regulations and the 
Authorities that promote them (l)”, presents  the marginal effects of the variables: 
REGGRL (-0.19), REG_SC (-0.26), LEAD_REP(-0.35) y OTROS (0.21).  These results 
indicate that boat-owners who display some of affinity with the regulations in general 
(REGGRL), or with the sea-cucumber regulations (REG_SC), have a transgression 
probability that is 0.19 and 0.26 lower, respectively.  The same occurs with those who 
consider that the boat-owner leadership represents their interests since their probability of 
transgression decreases by 0.35.  The contrary occurs with those individuals who declare 
                                                 
14 This result is counter-intuitive;  it is normally expected that an individual with a higher 
level of education respects the laws and regulations more.  Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
understand this result within the context of the operation of the participatory management 
system of the Galapagos since a more detailed analysis suggests that those with a higher 
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that other fishermen commit infractions (OTHER), since in this case the infringement 
probability increases by 0.21.  In Block VII “Sense of membership within the community 
(s)” the variables YRSMIG and YRSEXP, obtained marginal effects of 4.1 and 0.01, 
respectively.  The result of 4.1 for YRSMIG means that a unitary change of this indicator 
throws us outside the upper limit of the probability interval.  For example, if we consider 
the extreme case of a recent arrival, that is to say and individual with an immigration 
indicator equal to 1, this individual exhibits a probability of infringing close to or equal to 
the upper limit of the probability interval (that is, 1) which will always be higher than any 
other fisherman who has resided in the islands for a longer time.
15   Analogically, it is 
important to highlight the marginal effect of YRSEXP since it expresses that a unitary 
increase in the years of fishery experience reduces the infringement probability by 1%.  
Finally, in Block VIII “Participation  (u)”  the variable ATTEND has a marginal effect of 
–0.24, which means that the boat-owners who attend the co-operative meetings also display 
a 0.24 lower probability of infraction.  
Insert Table 3 
Using the coefficients obtained in the econometric estimation of Model 2 of the 
decision model of reported infractions shown in Table 2, and considering the sample 
                                                                                                                                                     
education are also more critical of the regulations and their own leader (see conclusions in 
section 5). 
15 Remember that ANIOSMGR is an immigration index that is constructed as:: 1/(Number 
of years residency in the Galapagos). The index adopts the value of zero en the case of 
natives and one for recent immigrants with a residency of one year.  This index is not very 
sensitive to the variance of years of residence on the islands, thus we see that for the 
interval of migration years observed in the sample – 1 to 53 years – the average increment 
of the index is very small (0.0185) for each year less of residency.  Hence, if we multiply it 
with the marginal effect (4.102), we obtain a percentage increase of 0.08 in the probability 
of infraction.  This is to say, a unitary change in the number of years of immigration, on 
average within the interval (1-53 years) leads to an increase of  8% in the probability of 
infringement.  
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averages of the selected variables presented in Table 1(b), we can write the probabilities of 
infraction of the fishery regulations of the SSFFG in the year 2001, as: 
Probability(INFRACTION=1)= Φ [-0.695-0.528* PROB1 –0.917* FINE+0.144* 
1.841+0.127* 10.058+1.091* ISLAND1-0.710*REGGRL-0.947 REG_SC+0.782* 
0.721-1.276* LEAD_REP+15.04* YRSMIG-0.033* 19.604-0.864 *ATTEND]. 
[3] 
 
With the purpose of enriching the analysis and highlighting the effect that the 
economic and social factors have on the decision of compliance, Table 4 presents the 
estimated probabilities of transgressing the regulations for various categories of boat-
owners.  Initially the boat-owners were divided in two groups: recent immigrant (7.5 years 
of residence
16) and natives of the Galapagos Islands
17.  This first differentiation between 
individuals complies with the fact that the marginal effect of YRSMIG is very strong; for 
this reason in an initial phase of the study, the existence of a structural difference between 
the group of natives and migrants was suspected.  Nevertheless, the statistic that was 
calculated to evaluate whether the infraction decision is based on being an immigrant, does 
not cast enough evidence to affirm the existence of structural differences.  
Additionally, within the immigrant and native groups, the individuals were 
differentiated according to their perception of the authorities’ vigilance, their perception of 
the size of fines, their place of residence, their affinity to the regulations and leadership of 
fishery co-operatives, and their participation in co-operative meetings.  These divisions 
generated 12 profiles with the peculiarity in that each individual within the immigrant 
group has a counterpart within the native group.  Finally, the probability of infraction was 
                                                 
16 The immigration index (ANIOSMGR) in this case is 0.133.  The number of yeas 
residency considered (7.5) is consistent with the expansion of migration registered in the 
1990s. 
17 The immigration index  (ANIOSMGR) for natives of the islands is 0. 
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calculated for each individual profile using expression [3].  These results are presented in 
Table 4. 
Within the group of recent immigrants, a probability of infringement is shown for 
individual “M” (0,997) who:  has not observed GNP or Navy vigilance; does not consider 
the fines applied by GNP to be high; does not agree with the regulations; does not consider 
the leadership of fishery co-operatives to be representative;  does not have a high 
attendance to organization meetings.  In contrast, M’s counterpart within the group of 
natives, individual “N”, shows a probability of non-compliance of 0.78.   It is interesting to 
note that if only the variables from Blocks I and II are modified – the individual  has 
observed surveillance and considers the fines to be high – the immigrant person (AM) 
displays a probability of infringement of 0.90 while his counterpart in the native group (AN) 
also experiences a decrease in the transgression probability to 0.25.  Another important 
observation occurs when the variables of Block VI, related to the legitimacy of  the 
regulations (REGGRL and REG_SC) are modified.  In this case, the individual BM from the 
immigration group exhibits an infraction probability of 0.87 and the counterpart in the 
native group (BN) presents a probability of  0.19.   This result indicates that individuals who 
show a degree of agreement with the regulations are more likely to respect the regulations.  
If we now modify the variables of Block VI , related to the attendance of organization 
meetings, related to the level of representation of the fishery leadership, and Block VIII, 
related to attendance to organization meetings,  we observe that individual (CM) exhibits an 
infringement probability of 0.74 – inferior to that of the previous individuals. Similarly, its 
counterpart (CN) in the native group presents a probability of 0.09; quite a lot lower than the 
previous native individual.  This result indicates that fishermen who feel that they are 
represented by the organizational leadership and also get involved in co-operative meetings 
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tend to have a lower probability of infringement than those who do not feel represented by 
the leadership and who do not attend the co-operative meetings.  Furthermore, the decrease 
in the probability due to these variables (LEAD_REP y ATTEND) is higher in magnitude 
than the decrease in probability that is due to the variables of Blocks I, II and those related 
to the legitimacy of the regulations.  
Additionally, when modifying jointly the variables grouped in Blocks VI and VIII 
(those that represent legitimacy of the regulations, representation of the leadership and 
participation in the co-operatives), its effect on the probability of infraction is magnified, 
achieving a reduction to 0,15 in the case of the immigrant subject (DM) and  0.001 in the 
case of the native individual (DN).  This combined effect of the variables in Block VI and 
VIII on the probability of infraction is reduced in the case of the fishermen that reside on 
Island 1 (the probability of infraction associated with the profile of a boat-owner such as EM  
is 0.526, while that of the profile EN  is only 0.026). 
Insert Table 4 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in the presented results, in general, the 
probability of infraction for each of the profiles for native boat-owners is inferior to the 
probability of its counterpart within the group of inmigrant profiles.  This result reaffirms 
the importance of the sense of belonging to a community as a determining key at the 
moment of deciding on the compliance of agreed norms.  Furthermore, this is an indication 
that the problems of  transgression of fishery regulations for the recent immigrant group 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we estimated a model of the decision to transgress the fishery 
regulations that incorporate not just economic aspects but also sociological types of 
variables. The estimation uses information based upon a special survey applied to a sample 
of fishery boat-owners who carry out their activities in the Galapagos National Park Marine 
Reserve of Ecuador.   
The results obtained from the econometric analysis are satisfactory.  Effectively, our 
estimations indicate that the decision of infraction of the fishery regulations in the case of 
boat-owners of the GNP are not only determined by expected costs and benefits of illegal 
activity but also by variables related to the perception of boat-owners with respect to the 
legitimacy of regulations, the level of membership within the community and participation 
in organizations. Specifically, it is important to emphasize the behavior of variables related 
to classic aspects considered in enforcement and compliance models, such as the 
probability of detection and punishment, the size of fines and economic incentives to 
infringe. According to our estimations, the estimated parameters for these variables turn out 
to be, in general, stastically significant and their effects on the decision of infraction show 
the expected signs.  
It is important to also emphasize the results obtained from variables that represent 
social aspects, which we consider to have influence on the compliance decision within the 
theoretical model: the level of legitimacy of the norms (l) and the sense of belonging to the 
community (s); as well as  the moral commitment the individual has to the compliance and 
success of the regulations, reflected in the level of participation in the institutions that 
generate the regulations (u).  The variables selected as proxies for the formerly mentioned 
aspects obtained statistically significant parameters and with expected signs.   These results 
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imply that the level of legitimacy that the regulations have within the group of boat-owners, 
the individual’s sense of belonging, the legitimacy of local organizations as well as the 
levels of intervention in these organizations
18, are factors that positively influence the 
decision to respect the agreed regulations. In this way, the obtained results contribute with 
empirical evidence to the validation of recent theoretical developments to explain the 
decision of compliance of the regulations that govern the management of natural resources 
under schemes of common property goods.  
The mentioned results suggest that the decision of the Galapagos fishery boat-
owners to violate regulations do not only consider such as surveillance, perception of the 
probability of being punished or the size of fines, but also that their decisions consider 
economic incentives linked to vessel operation and aspects referring to the participatory 
management system of the GMR such as level of agreement with the regulations, their 
affinity with the regulating institutions and the level of representation of grass-root 
organizations.  
Additionally, the results are limited in terms of determining a profile based on 
particular characteristics.  Only two characteristics were identified to be significant in the 
decision: the residency of Island 1 and the level of formal education. The result concerning 
residency shows that individuals who reside on Island 1 have a higher  tendency to commit 
infractions than the rest of the boat-owners.   Equally, the result concerning education 
implies that those who have a more years of education tend to violate the regulations more. 
Nevertheless if we analyze the individuals with higher levels of education within the 
context of participatory management, we observe that the majority of these individuals 
(56%) disagree with the regulations, and also most of them (81%) consider the 
                                                 
18 By local organizations, we refer only to fishery co-operatives. 
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representation of the leadership to be mediocre or inadequate
19. This suggests that there is a 
relation between education and adopting a critical position towards the regulations and the 
leadership, and as we observed in the previous results, these aspects are vital in the decision 
to comply. 
The results obtained in the calculation of marginal effects of each variable on the 
decision to violate the regulations and the level of probability for selected types of boat-
owner, give rise to interesting conclusions that may be useful for the management authority 
of the reserve.  It is important to underline that the results suggest that policy instruments 
that are limited to improving the capability of detection and increasing the level of applied 
sanctions always have inferior results in terms of deterring the violation of regulations 
when compared to those instruments orientated towards promoting the legitimacy of the 
norms, improving the representation of individuals by the leadership of local organizations 
or increasing the participation of individuals with-in grass-root organizations.  This result is 
observed whether the boat-owner is a recent immigrant or native, and whether the 
individual resides on Island 1 or not. This result is specially useful for the national park 
authority as well as conservation organizations that work in the islands since an assignment 
of effort and resources directed at improving the legitimacy of the regulations and 
strengthening the co-operative organizations will have positive pay-backs in terms of 
respecting the regulations. This does not mean abandonment of traditional strategies of  
enforcement, control and surveillance and the application of fines, since it is likely within 
all groups, the presence of chronic violators of the regulations who can only be controlled 
by traditional methods such as toughening the sanctions and more surveillance. The control 
                                                 
19 Those individuals with 12 or more years of schooling were considered to belong to the 
higher educated group; they represent 37% of the sample. 
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of these individuals becomes important in the context of that the illegal conduct of these 
individuals erodes the level of legitimacy of norms and increases the probability of 
infractions of their fellow fishermen – remembering that the variable OTHER has a 
marginal effect of 0.21 on the probability of infringement
20. 
In summary, the empirical results confirm the positive contribution of the 
Participatory Management System implemented by the Galapagos Marine Reserve on the 
compliance of the regulations, and furthermore, underline the potential of the system to 
increase compliance of the regulations between the boat-owners of the SSFFG.  This is a 
desirable objective considering that the conservation and sustainable management of this 
important economic ecosystem depends upon them. 
Finally, it would be desirable in the future to develop an investigation that goes 
further into the probable differences that exist in the compliance decision of the native 
individual with deeper roots islands, and the recent immigrants since the potential results 
would be useful for improving the management policies of the GNP. 
                                                 
20 It is important to underline that the surveilence effort of the GNP is not destined soley to 
the control of the activities of the SSFFG, but also the illegal incursion of continental and 
foreign vessels.   The weakening of control or sanctions of the illegal conduct of the 
chronic infringers or vessels outside of the community, according to Kuperan and Sutinen 
(1997) may send two messages to the rest of the boat-owners who normally comply: 1) the 
regulations are unfair and 2) the regulations do not adecuately protect the fishery resource 
nor the local fisherman. 
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Table 1(a). Description of the Variables used in the Econometric Model 
Name of the Variable and description  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
INFRACTION: 1: If the boat-owner acknowledges: capturing shark; rarely fulfilling regulations or having made some infraction. 0: otherwise. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
I. Probability of Detection and Punishment (v)  
ZONE: 1: If the boat-owner fishes in North, North West, or West zones or declares to operate in the whole archipelago. 0: otherwise.  
MOTORHP: Defined as the power of the boat ‘s motor; this variable is expressed in horses of power (HP).  
AGE: Age of the boat-owner in years.  
PROB1: 1: If the boat-owner states having seen the surveillance of the GNP or the National Army: always (A), almost always (AA) or 
sometimes (ST). 0: otherwise. 
PROB2: 1: If the boat-owner states having been boarded for inspection A, AA or ST by personal of the GNP or the National Army. 0: 
otherwise.  
PROB3: 1: If the boat-owner considers that ships detained for infractions are punished A, AA or ST. 0: otherwise. 
PUNISH: 1: If the boat-owner indicates having been punished at some time. 0: otherwise. 
II. Magnitude of the fine. ( f ) 
FINE: 1: If the boat-owner considers that the fines applied to offenders are high. 0: otherwise. 
III. Structure of Costs (k )  
STORAGE: Indicates the storage capacity of the boat in metric tons (TM).  
DAYCOST: Indicates the daily cost in American dollars of a fishery trip.  
CAPITAL: Indicates the commercial value of the ship in American dollars.  
INDEBT: 1: If the boat-owner declares having a debt related to fishery activity. 0: otherwise. 
IV. Structure of Prices (p)  
PRICEIND: Price Index based on the market prices of the species the boat-owner caught, weighted by the share of  each species in the total 
income of boat-owners. The index is expressed in American dollars.  
V. Individual characteristics (a )  
MARRIED: 1:If the boat-owner is married or cohabiting. 0: otherwise (single, separate, widow)  
FAMILY: The number of boat-owner family members.  
EDUCACI: Number of years of formal education completed.   
ISLAND1: 1: If the boat-owner lives on the Islands. 0: otherwise 
VI. Legitimacy of the Regulations and Authorities that promote them (l).  
REGGRL: 1: If the boat-owner strongly agrees (SA), agrees (A) or neither agrees nor disagrees (NA/ND) with the fishery regulations. 0: 
otherwise  
REG_SH: 1: If the boat-owner strongly disagrees (SD), disagrees (D) or NA/ND, with allowing shark fishery. 0: otherwise. 
REG_SE: 1: if the boat-owner strongly agrees (SA), agrees (A) or NA/ND with the statement: “ no-catch seasons benefits the fisherman “. 0: 
otherwise.  
REG_SC: 1: If the boat-owner strongly disagrees (SD), disagrees (D) or NA/ND with allowing unregulated fishery of sea cucumber. 
0:otherwise  
OTHER: 1: If the boat-owner declares that other fishermen usually make some infraction of those commonly detected by the GNP. 0: otherwise.
JMPAIM: 1: If the boat-owner considers that the JMP/AIM takes into account the sector fishery  little time, most of time or every time. 0: 
otherwise. 
LEAD_REP:1: If the boat-owner considers that his leaders represent the interests of the sector appropriately or at least they represent them 
fairly. 0: otherwise 
VII. Sense of Ownership to the community (s).  
NATIVE: 1: The boat-owner was born in the Galapagos. 0: otherwise 
MOVECONT: 1: If the boat-owner declares that he could change his residence to the continent. 0: otherwise 
YRSMIG: 1/Number of years of immigration.  
FISHEXC: 1: If the boat-owner is exclusively  devoted to the fishery activity . 0: otherwise 
YRSEXP: Years of experience that the boat-owner has in the fishery activity.  
VIII. Participation (or)  
COOPDIR:1: If the boat-owner is a representative or occupies some directive position in the Cooperatives. 0: otherwise.  
ATTEND:1: If the boat-owner attends all the meetings of the cooperative. 0: otherwise.  
Source: Elaborated by the authors.  
a: The variables ZONE, PROB1, PROB2, PROB3, MARRIED, ISLAND1, REGGRL, REG_SH, REG_SE, REG_SC, JMPAIM, and LEAD_REP that originally 
were of multiple discreet answer have been transformed to binary discreet variables, with the purpose of increasing the degrees of freedom in the regression and of 
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Table 1 (b). Description of the Variables used in the Econometric Model  






DEPENDENT VARIABLE          
INFRACTION   0.305 0.462 1,51 N/A  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES          
I. Probability of Detection and Punishment (v)          
ZONE   0.760 0.429 0.56 - 
MOTORHP   68.554 42.452 0.62 + 
AGE 40.507 10.640 0.26 - 
PROB1   0.409 0.493 1.21 - 
PROB2   0.305 0.462 1.51 - 
PROB3   0.409 0.493 1.21 - 
PUNISH:   0.292 0.456 1.56 - 
II. Magnitude of the fine. ( f )       
FINE   0.481 0.501 1.04 - 
III. Structure of Costs (k )         
STORAGE   1.841 2.430 1.32 + 
DAYCOST   108.920 115.591 1.06 + 
CAPITAL   43746.200 103634.000 2.37 + 
INDEBT   0.468 0.501 1.07 + 
IV. Structure of Prices (p)          
PRICEIND   2.412 1.726 0.72 + 
V. Individual characteristics (a )         
MARRIED   0.877 0.330 0.38 ? 
FAMILIA 3.500 1.958 0.56 ? 
EDUCACI   10.058 3.869 0.38 ? 
ISLAND1   0.286 0.453 1.58 ? 
VI. Legitimacy of the Regulations and Authorities that promote them (l).        
REGGRL   0.435 0.497 1.14 - 
REG_SH   0.305 0.462 1.51 - 
REG_SE   0.909 0.288 0.32 - 
REG_SC   0.708 0.456 0.64 - 
OTHER 0.721 0.450 0.62 + 
JMPAIM   0.552 0.499 0.90 - 
LEAD_REP   0.273 0.447 1.64 - 
VII. Sense of Ownership to the community (s).          
NATIVO   0.474 0.501 1.06 - 
MOVECONT   0.084 0.279 3.32 + 
YRSMIG   0.023 0.028 1.22 + 
FISHEXC 
b 0.805 0.397 0.49 - 
YRSEXP   19.604 10.447 0.53 - 
VIII. Participation (u)          
COOPDIR   0.273 0.447 1.64 - 
ATTEND 0.370 0.484 1.31 - 
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the survey of September 2002.  
a: The sign “+”means the expected sign for the parameter of this variable is positive. The “- “ means we expect a negative sign for this parameter. The 
“?” points out there is uncertainty about the sign of the parameter for this variable.  
b: The variables FISHEXC and YRSEXP represent the involvement of the boat owner in their union, therefore it is expected that  those whose only 
economic activity is fishery or  who have several years of experience in the sector  are  more likely to be respectful to regulations.
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Table 2. Estimation Results  
Block    Model 1  Model 2 
 Variables  Coefficient  “t”  Std.   Coefficient  “t”  Std.   
  CONSTANT -1.077 -0.608    -0.695 -0.807 
I  ZONE 0.402 1.014         
  MOTORHP 0.003 0.494         
  AGE 0.004 0.158         
  PROB1 -1.003 -2.307**  -0.528 -1.793* 
  PROB2 0.416 1.022         
  PROB3 -0.055 -0.151         
  PUNISH 0.759 1.895*   
II  FINE -1.154 -2.695*** -0.917 -2.959*** 
III  STORAGE 0.177 2.020**  0.144 2.590*** 
  DAYCOST -0.004 -1.626         
  CAPITAL 0.263 1.162         
  INDEBT 0.356 1.020         
IV  PRICEIND 0.037 0.416         
V  MARRIED -0.797 -1.407         
  FAMILIA 0.009 0.099         
  EDUCACI 0.125 2.359**  0.127 2.870*** 
  ISLAND1 0.843 1.987**  1.091 3.253*** 
VI  REGGRL -1.075 -2.548**  -0.710 -2.352** 
  REG_SH 0.368 0.822         
  REG_SE -0.025 -0.043         
  REG_SC -1.174 -2.831*** -0.947 -2.969*** 
  OTHER 0.723 1.686*  0.782 2.281** 
  JMPAIM -0.155 -0.418         
  LEAD_REP -1.378 -3.174*** -1.276 -3.418*** 
VII  NATIVO 0.856 1.531         
  MOVECONT 0.115 0.172         
  YRSMIG 21.529 2.184**  15.040 2.667*** 
  FISHEXC 0.459 0.954         
  YRSEXP -0.047 -1.885*  -0.033 -2.122** 
VIII  COOPDIR 0.299 0.726         
  ATTEND -1.048 -2.805*** -0.864 -2.954*** 
  Number of Observations  154   154  
  2 χ   81.11  62.85  
  Critical Value at 5%  =
2
) 31 ( χ 44.99   =
2
) 12 ( χ 21.03  
  % correct  84.4   80.5  
Source: Elaborated by the authors from the econometric estimation results of the models. 
*   Coefficient significant at 10%, two-tail test  
     **   Coefficient significant at 5%, two-tail test  
   *** Coefficient significant at 1%, two-tail test  
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Table 3. Marginal Effects of the Independent Variables 
Block    Model 1  Model 2 
  Variables  Marginal Effect  Marginal Effect 
  CONSTANT  -0.216   -0.190 
I  ZONE  0.095      
  MOTORHP  0.001      
  AGE  0.001      
  PROB1  -0.229**  -0.144* 
  PROB2  0.092      
  PROB3  -0.013      
  PUNISH  0.175*   
II  FINE  -0.263*** -0.250*** 
III  STORAGE  0.040**  0.039*** 
  DAYCOST  -0.001      
  CAPITAL  0.059      
  INDEBT  0.080      
IV  PRICEIND  0.010      
V  MARRIED  -0.189      
  FAMILIA  0.003      
  EDUCACI  0.028**  0.035*** 
  ISLAND1  0.188**  0.297*** 
VI  REGGRL  -0.247**  -0.194** 
  REG_SH  0.085      
  REG_SE  -0.004      
  REG_SC  -0.264*** -0.258*** 
  OTHER  0.163*  0.213** 
  JMPAIM  -0.035      
  LEAD_REP  -0.311*** -0.348*** 
VII  NATIVO  0.182      
  MOVECONT  0.034      
  YRSMIG  4.601**  4.102*** 
  FISHEXC  0.106      
  YRSEXP  -0.011*  -0.010** 
VIII  COOPDIR  0.067      
  ATTEND  -0.237*** -0.236*** 
Source: Elaborated by the authors with the econometric estimation results. 
*   Coefficient significant at 10%, two-tail test  
     **   Coefficient significant at 5%, two-tail test  
   *** Coefficient significant at 1%, two-tail test  
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Table 4. Probability of committing an infraction by type of boat-owner 
a 
Recent Immigrants  Natives  Block   Variable  Characteristics of the 
Boat-owner 
b 
M AM B M C M D M E M N AN B N C N D N E N 
I  PROB1  Boat-owner has observed 
surveillance of the GNP or
the National Navy almost 
always or sometimes. 
NO YES NO  NO  NO  NO  NO YES NO  NO  NO  NO 
II  FINE  Boat-owner considers the 
fines to be high 
NO YES NO  NO  NO  NO  NO YES NO  NO  NO  NO 
V  ISLAND1  Boat-owner resides on 
Island 1 
NO NO NO NO NO  YES  NO NO NO NO NO  YES 
VI GRL  Boat-owner  strongly 
agrees, agrees or is 
indifferent with the 
regulations of small-scale 
fishery in general. 
NO NO YES NO YES  YES NO  NO YES NO YES  YES 
  REG_SC  Boat-owner strongly 
agrees, agrees or is 
indifferent with the 
regulations that are 
applied to the capture of 
sea-cucumber. 
NO NO YES NO YES  YES NO  NO YES NO YES  YES 
 LEAD_REP  Boat-owner feels that the 
leadership of the fishery 
sector represents its 
interests or at least 
moderately represents 
them. 
NO NO NO  YES  YES  YES  NO NO NO  YES  YES  YES 
VII YRSMIG  Number of years that the 
boat-owner has resided on 
the islands in the case of 
not being a native. 
7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5  Native Native Native  Native  Native Native
VIII  ATTEND  The boat-owner attends all 
of the co-operative 
meetings 
NO NO NO  YES  YES  YES  NO NO NO  YES  YES  YES 
   
Probability of infringement  0.997 0.908 0.868 0.736 0.153 0.526 0.779 0.249 0.187 0.085 0.001 0.026 
Source: Elaboration by the authors with the results obtained from the econometric estimations (2002). 
a: Model 2 is defined as: 
INFRAC2=INFRAC(CONSTANT,PROB1,FINE,PUNISH,STORAGE,EDUCACI,ISLAND1,REGGRL,REG_SH,REG_SC,OTROS,LEAD_REP,YRSMIG
,ATTEND).  
b: To calculate the probability of infraction, the specified variables were considered relevant at 5% and 10%. The most prominent results are presented here.
c: The probability of infraction is calculated with the average of the variables (continuous and discrete), except for the variables presented in this table. 
 